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2002年度欧州造船政策動向調査

 事業名 造船関連海外情報収集及び海外業務協力事業
 団体名 シップ・アンド・オーシャン財団  


3. DETAILED COST INVESTIGATIONS
3.1. Update of previous investigations
In order to collect the necessary data, the Commission has recourse to consultants whose ongoing study has defined a cost breakdown model, including all relevant cost components both of the direct ship production and the shipyard in general, The model is based on cost elements covering direct costs (materials, labour, equipment, etc.) and indirect costs (financing of the ship and of the production equipment, overhead, insurance, etc.). The calculated building price also includes a 5 % profit margin. More details of the cost model can be found in Annex I of the first report.
 
As the study develops, additional information is gathered and used to validate previous cost investigations. Consequently, the 32 orders placed in Korea covered in the first four reports have been recalculated and the updated findings are given below. As already stated in the first report all parameters are based on a prudent approach to ensure that calculated minimum costs for particular projects will be difficult to challenge. The updated analysis includes assumptions on inflation. With orders taken now but executed in the coming two to three years it is considered normal business practice to assess future costs at the time of building up to delivery.
 
Since the 4th shipbuilding report the analytical approach has been reviewed in order to compare investigation results based on the initial method, namely the calculation of contributions to debt servicing (in USD per cgt) that have to be carried by the individual shipbuilding project, to results based on "costs" stemming from facility depreciation. There is no consistent approach to depreciation in Korea, i.e. different shipyards use different depreciation periods and calculation methods and it is therefore very difficult to assign those costs to individual shipbuilding projects.
 
Nevertheless these alternative calculations have provided a clear picture: Yards, such as Hyundai (HHI), Hanjin (HHIC) and Samsung (SHI), which have not benefited from large scale debt restructuring and which operate comparatively "old" facilities show (slightly) higher production costs under the debt-based methodology, while yards, such as Daewoo (DSME) and Daedong, which benefited from debt reductions and moratoria but operate comparatively "new" facilities show (slightly) higher production costs when basing the investigations on the depreciation approach. The two approaches give very similar results for the other two major Korean yards, Hyundai Mipo and Samho. Of course, results are also influenced by the financing terms of the individual projects investigated, Large up-front payments allow the yard to collect interest while tail-heavy payment terms increase financial costs. On the other hand these payment terms have no influence on depreciation. Delivery dates for individual orders may also play a role, if for example debt moratoria have expired by then and the vessel needs to contribute to the required debt servicing. In summary the differences between the two approaches are insignificant and do not change the conclusions from the individual cost investigations.
 
In the context of the first shipbuilding report nine orders placed at South Korean shipyards were investigated. In addition to these orders, nine more orders placed in Korea have been analysed for the second report and seven investigations were added in the third report. The fourth report covered seven additional orders. The Commission ensured a balanced selection of shipbuilding contracts while taking into account the overall objective of the exercise, the relative urgency of the matter, and the availability of meaningful data for comparison. The Commission is convinced that the information entered into the analysis is at present the best available and reliable. The following table summarises the updated findings for the 32 orders placed in Korea. In order to be consistent with the previous reports and as differences between investigation methodologies are in general not significant, all results presented are based on the debt servicing approach.
 
Table 4 
- Comparison of reported order prices and calculated construction prices for selected new shipbuilding contracts (update)
Shipyard Shiptype Owner Contract
price
(Mio.
USD)
Normal
price14
(Mio.
USD)
Loss/gain
as % of
normal
price
Ref.to
ship-
building
report no.
Daedong(*) 35 000 dwt
tanker
Seaarland 21,5 26,0 -17 % 1
Daedong Panamax
bulker
Sanama 18,5 26,1 -29 % 1
Daedong(*) 46 000 dwt
chemical tanker
Cogema 24,5 28,1 -13 % 2
Daedong 2 500 TEU EF Shipping 30,0 31,4 -4 % 4
Daewoo(*) VLCC Anangel 68,5 73,6 -7 % 1
Daewoo(*)/(**) Ferry Moby 74,3 89,0 -17 % 2
Daewoo(*) Panamax
bulker
Chandris 22,5 23,5 -4 % 2
Daewoo(*) LNG carrier Bergesen 151,1 159,6 -5 % 3
Daewoo ULCC Majestic
Shipping
85,0 94,0 -10 % 4
Halla(*) Panamax
bulker
Diana 18,9 31,0 -39 % 1
Halla(*) 3 500 TEU Detjen 38,0 52,8 -28 % 1
Halla(*) Capesize bulker Cargocean 32,0 45,8 30 % 2
Samho (ex-Halla) Aframax tanker Chartworld
Shipping
33,5 41,3 -19 % 4
HHI(*) 6 800 TEU P&O Nedlloyd 73,5 81,0 -9 % 1
HHI(*) 5 600 TEU K Line 54,3 59,3 -8 % 2
HHI(*) LNG carrier Bonny Gas 165,0 182,5 -10 % 2
HHI(*) 5 500 TEU Yang Ming 56,0 64,6 -13 % 2
HHI Ferry Stena 70,0 88,4 -21 % 4
HHI Suezmax tanker Jebsen 43,0 51,5 -17 % 4
HHI(***) 7 200 TEU Hapag-Lloyd 72,0 81,0 -11 % 3
HHI Suezmax tanker Athenian Sea
Carriers
43,0 50,8 -7 % 3
Hyundai Mipo Cable layer Ozone 37,3 46,8 -20 % 1
Hyundai Mipo Chemical
tanker
Bottiglieri 24,5 27,3 -10 % 4
HHIC(*) 6 250 TEU Conti 62,0 66,0 -6 % 3
HHIC(*) 5 6O8 TEU Conti 58,0 62,3 -7 % 3
HHIC(*) 1 200 TEU Rickmers 19,5 21,2 -8 % 3
Il Heung 3 700 dwt
chemical tanker
Naviera Quimica 10,5 13,0 -19 % 2
Samsung(*) 5 500 TEU Nordcapital 55,0 71,8 -23 % 2
Samsung(*) 3 400 TEU CP Offen 36,0 59,9 -40 % 1
Samsung(*) Ferry Minoan 69,5 95,6 -27 % 1
Samsung 7 400 TEU OOCL 79,7 94,1 -15 % 4
Shina Product tanker Fratelli D'Amato 21,7 24,1 -10 % 3
(*) These orders were recalculated after new information on the debt situation of the companies or on the specific order was received.
(**) This order was recalculated after the correct contract price was revealed in the owner's account statement for 2000.
(***) This order was recalculated after the correct contract price was revealed in the press.
 
Since the last shipbuilding report six more orders (all placed in South Korea) were investigated in detail, in order to establish the actual building costs. The investigated orders are:
 
- VLCC, 48 120 cgt, to be built at Samho Heavy Industries;
 
- LNG carrier (series of 5), 71 850 cgt, to be built at Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering Co. Ltd. (DSME);
 
- LNG carrier, 69 675 cgt, to be built at Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI);
 
- LNG carrier (series of 2), 88 500 cgt, to be built at Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI);
 
- Suezmax crude oil tanker (series of 4), 30 800 cgt, to be built at Samho Heavy Industries;
 
- 5 762 TEU containership (series of 2), 42 835 cgt to be built at Samsung Heavy Industries (SHI);
 
Table 5 summarises the findings from the new cost investigations.
 
Table 5 
- Comparison of reported order prices and calculated construction prices for selected new ships (new investigations)
Shipyard Shiptype Owner Contract price
(Mio. USD)
Normal price15
(Mio. USD)
Loss/gain as %
of normal price
Samho VLCC Oldendorff 69,5 81,0 -14,2 %
DSME LNG Exmar 162,0 159,1 +1,8 %
SHI LNG British Gas 162,5 166,0 -2,1 %
HHI LNG Colar 162.6 159.3 +2,1 %
Samho Suezmax tanker Thenmaris 43,0 54,0 -20,0 %
SHI Containership CP Offen 55,0 59,3 -7,3 %
 
While the level of price under-cutting seems to diminish, mainly due to foreign exchange gains in 2001 which are expected to be eroded by forecasted wage increases and inflation16, the investigations confirm certain known business patterns of Korean yards. As mentioned before the cost investigations and their under-lying assumptions are constantly reviewed in order to take into account the latest developments in the yards and in the Korean economy. Therefore debt restructuring and re-financing efforts, as well as more favourable conditions e.g. stemming from increased cash flow, are recognised and results therefore may look more positive. However, the Commission concluded in its TBR report that most of these efforts cannot be considered compatible with WTO rules and Korean yards, despite coming close to covering their operating costs, are causing material injury to EU shipbuilders. Without recognition of the various measures undertaken in Korea in order to improve the yards' financial situation the results of the cost investigations would show a serious gap between full costs and offer prices. Samho, like its predecessor Halla, continues to price vessels far below building costs, although losses of up to 40 % of actual building costs as in the past are no longer accepted since the management of the yard was taken over by Hyundai. Samho also increased production under the new management, nearly doubling it and focussing mainly on tankers and thus achieving a better economy of scale. Prices at Samho are now seen to reflect at least operating costs, although there is still no provision to service or reduce the company's debts.
 
DSME has become the leading builder of LNG carriers in the world, with sixteen ships on order, giving the yard an economy of scale unseen before. However, the detailed analysis undertaken revealed that for the construction of LNG carriers there are limits to the improvement in efficiency as some yard equipment needs to be duplicated, leading to high up-front investment costs. Furthermore, DSME managed to start as a new company in late 2000, shedding most of the debts of its predecessor. Therefore DSME can operate a very large state-of-the-art shipyard without the massive initial investment costs being reflected in their product prices. Nevertheless DSME still stands at a debt to equity ratio of 279 % (estimated for 2001), and although it is currently cash rich due to high order intake in 2001, this is likely to be dissipated when those orders need to go into production and the actual building costs begin to be incurred.
 
SHI remains burdened with a comparatively high level of debt (the debt to equity ratio for 2001 is estimated to be still more than 200 %) and this fact is reflected in their cost base. SHI also suffers from a lower productivity than its Korean competitors, leading to higher wage costs. In addition SHI did not manage to attract multiple orders as Daewoo and Hyundai did and this has to show in the unit costs.
 
After being able to dispose of some non-performing assets stemming from HHI's previous engagement with other Hyundai subsidiaries, HHI seems now to be heading towards profitability. HHI's debt to equity ratio is assumed to reach 183 % in 2001, but, as with all Korean yards, an assessment of the yard's financial situation is difficult to make. Very few meaningful financial figures are given and published accounts are not very recent and have little or no annotations.

14 The normal price includes the cost elements covering direct costs (material, labour, equipment, etc.) and indirect costs (financing of the ship and the production equipment, overhead, insurance, etc.). It also includes a 5 % profit margin.
15 On the definition of normal price see footnote 14.
16 The Won weakened Significantly against the USD in the first half of 2001, moving from a prevailing level of around 1 130 Won to the USD to a level around 1 300. Annual wage increases are expected to be around 10 % while inflation is still comparatively high at around 8 % per annum.







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更新日: 2020年5月23日

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