In the light of the foregoing, the conclusions and the suggested course of action are as follows:
The evidence available leads to the conclusion that the KEXIM: programmes led to the granting of subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the ASCM to Korean shipbuilders.
Furthermore, the investigation shows that Korea has granted through corporate restructuring subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the ASCM to the following shipyards:
- Halla Engineering and Heavy Industries (now called Samho Heavy Industries),
- Daedong Shipbuilding Co., and
- Daewoo Heavy Industries (now called Daewoo Shipbuilding Marine Engineering).
A subsidy has also been granted to Daewoo through taxation programmes.
The KEXIM subsidies are de jure export contingent within the meaning of Article 3 of the ASCM and therefore, in accordance with Article 2.3, specific.
There is prima facie evidence that corporate restructuring and taxation subsidies are export contingent within the meaning of Article 3 of the ASCM and therefore, in accordance with Article 2.3, specific; they are in any event specific within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the ASCM.
There is evidence that the subsidies are causing adverse effects to Community industry within the meaning of Article 5 of the ASCM and are, therefore, actionable.
The investigation will continue with a view to collect further information, in particular with regard to the export subsidies.
The Commission will immediately pursue the matter with the Korean authorities in order to obtain the withdrawal of the subsidies or the removal of the adverse effects. Unless such a solution is achieved amicably within the next few weeks the initiation of a procedure within the framework of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, and more particularly pursuant to the relevant provisions of the ASCM, might be required.